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Abstract-While many technologies that make use of computing 
haveproven themselves extremely reliable and trustworthy-
computers helped transport people to the moon and back,they 
control critical aircraft systems for millions of flightsevery 
year, and they move trillions of dollars around theglobe daily—
they generally haven't reached the point wherepeople are 
willing to entrust them with their lives, implicitlyor explicitly. 
Many people are reluctant to entrust today'scomputer systems 
with their personal information, such asfinancial and medical 
records, because they are increasinglyconcerned about the 
security and reliability of these systems,which they view as 
posing significant societal risk. Ifcomputing is to become truly 
ubiquitous—and fulfill theimmense promise of technology—we 
will have to make thecomputing ecosystem sufficiently 
trustworthy that peopledon't worry about its fallibility or 
unreliability the way theydo today. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
rust is a broad concept, and making something 
trustworthy requires a social infrastructure as well as 
solid engineering. All systems fail from time to time; the 
legal and commercial practices within which they're 
embedded can compensate for the fact that no technology 
will ever be perfect. Hence this is not only a struggle to 
make software trustworthy; because computers have to some 
extent already lost people's trust, we will have to overcome a 
legacy of machines that fail, software that fails, and systems 
that fail. We will have to persuade people that the systems, 
the software, the services, the people, and the companies 
have all, collectively, achieved a new level of availability, 
dependability, and confidentiality. We will have to 
overcome the distrust that people now feel for computers. 
The Trustworthy Computing Initiative is a label for awhole 
range of advances that have to be made for people to be as 
comfortable using devices powered by computers and 
software as they are today using a device that is powered by 
electricity. It may take us ten to fifteen years to get there, 
both as an industry and as a society. This is a "sea change" 
not only in the way we write and deliver software, but also 
in the wayour society views computing generally. There 
areimmediate problems to be solved, andfundamental open 
research questions. There are 
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Actions that individuals and companies can andshould take, 
but there are also problems that canonly be solved 
collectively by consortia, researchcommunities, nations, and 
the world as a whole. 
II. TRUSTWORTHY COMPUTING 
Computing devices and information services will only be 
truly pervasive when they are so dependable that we can just 
forget about them. In other words, at a time where 
computers are starting to find their way into just about every 
aspect of our life, we need to be able to trust them. Yet the 
way we build computers, and the way that we now build 
services around those computers, hasn't really changed that 
much in the last 30 or 40 years. It will need to. 
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR TRUSTWORTHY COMPUTING 
We failed to find an existing taxonomy that could provide a 
framework for discussing Trustworthy Computing. There is 
no shortage of trust initiatives, but the focus of each is 
narrow. For example, there are treatments of trust in 
ecommerce transactions and trust between authentication 
systems, and analyses of public perceptions of computing, 
but a truly effective approach needs to integrate engineering, 
policy, and user attitudes. Even just on the engineering side, 
our scope is broader than, say, the SysTrust/SAS70 models, 
which deal purely with large online systems. First, there are 
the machines themselves. They need to be reliable enough 
that we can embed them in all kinds of devices—in other 
words, they shouldn't fail more frequently than other 
similarly important technologies in our lives. Then there's 
the software that operates those machines: do people trust it 
to be equally reliable? And finally there are the service 
components, which are also largely software-dependent. 
This is a particularly complicated problem, because today 
we have to build dependability into an end-to-end, richly 
interconnected (and sometimes federated) system. Since 
trust is a complex concept, it is helpful to analyze the 
objective of Trustworthy Computing from a number of 
different perspectives. We define three dimensions with 
which to describe different perspectives on trust: Goals, 
Means, and Execution. 
IV. GOALS 
The Goals consider trust from the user's point ofview. The 
key questions are: Is the technologythere when I need it? 
Does it keep myconfidential information safe? Does it do 
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whatit's supposed to do? And do the people who ownand 
operate the business that provides it alwaysdo the right 
thing? These are the goals that anyTrustworthy Computing 











Once the Goals are in place, we can look at the problem 
from the industry's point of view. Means are the business 
and engineering considerations that are employed to meet 
the Goals; they are the nuts and bolts of a trustworthy 
service. Whereas the Goals are largely oriented towards the 
end-user, the Means are inwardly facing, intra-company 
considerations. Think of the Goals as what is delivered, and 
the Means as how. 
VI. EXECUTION 
Execution is the way an organization conducts its operations 
to deliver the components required for Trustworthy 
Computing. There are three aspects to this: Intents, 
Implementation, and Evidence. Intents are the corporate and 
legislative guidance that sets requirements for the design, 
implementation, and support of the product. 
Implementation is the business process that operationalizes 
the Intents. Evidence is the mechanism by which we verify 
that the Implementation has delivered on the Intent. This 
problem can only be tackled by working on two parallel 
tracks. The first track is the immediate problems—what 
people read and worry about every day. We need to address 
known current problems and mitigate currently known 
weaknesses. This is also a way to learn about the more 
fundamental problems. We need to be as well-informed as 
we can about what is really going on and what we can and 
cannot fix within the constraints of the current systems. The 
computer industry needs to identify and solve the most 

























way into the huge legacy systems that have been built. There 
will be long technological replacement cycle during which 
the critical infrastructure systems that society depends on 
are gradually upgraded to a new and improved status. If  
these systems already exist, people are not just going to 
throw them out the. 
window and start over from scratch. So we have to identify 
critical infrastructure and systems weaknesses and upgrade 
them on a high-priority basis, and ensure that new 
infrastructures are built on sound principles. 
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VII. FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS POLICY 
Society is only now coming to grips with the fact that it is 
critically dependent on computers. The computer industry 
must find the appropriate balance between the need for a 
regulatory regime and the impulses of an industry that has 
grown up unregulated and relying upon de facto standards. 
Many contemporary infrastructure reliability problems are 
really policy issues. The poor coverage and service of US 
cellular service providers is due in part to the FCC's policy 
of not granting nationwide licenses. These policy questions 
often cross national borders, as 
illustrated by the struggle to establish global standards for 
third-generation cellular technologies. Existing users of 
spectrum (often the military) occupy different bands in 
different countries, and resist giving them up, making it 
difficult to find common spectrum worldwide. 
VIII. PROCESSING COMPLEXITY 
We are seeing the advent of mega-scale computing systems 
built out of loose affiliations of services, machines, and 
application software. The emergent (and very different) 
behavior of such systems is a growing long-term risk. An 
architecture built on diversity is robust, but it also operates 
on the edge of chaos. This holds true in all very-large-scale 
systems, from naturalsystems like the weather to human-
made systemslike markets and the power grid. All the 
previousmega-scale systems that we've built—the power 
grid, the telephone systems—have experiencedunpredicted 
emergent behavior. That is why in1965 the power grid failed 
and rippled down thewhole East Coast of the United States, 
and that'swhy whole cities occasionally drop off the 
telephone network when somebody implementsa bug fix on 
a single switch. The complexity ofthe system has 
outstripped the ability of any oneperson—or any single 
entity—to understand allof the interactions.Incredibly secure 
and trustworthy computersystems exist today, but they are 
largelyindependent, single-purpose systems that 
aremeticulously engineered and then isolated. Wereally 
don't know what's going to happen as wedynamically stitch 
together billions—perhapseven trillions—of intelligent and 
interdependentdevices that span many different types and 
generations of software and architectures.As the power of 
computers increase, in bothstorage and computational 
capacity, the absolutescale, and complexity of the attendant 
softwaregoes up accordingly. This manifests itself inmany 
ways, ranging from how you administerthese machines to 
how you know when they arebroken, how you repair them, 
and how you addmore capability. All these aspects 
ultimately playinto whether people perceive the system as 
trustworthy. 
IX. MACHINE-TO-MACHINE PROCESSES 
The Web Services model is characterized bycomputing at 
the edge of the network. Peer-topeerapplications will be the 
rule, and there willbe distributed processing and storage. An 
administrative regime for such a system 
requiressophisticated machine-to-machine processes.Data 
will be self-describing. Machines will beloosely coupled, 
self-configuring, and self organizing. They will manage 
themselves to conform to policy set at the center.Web 
applications will have to be designed tooperate in an 
asynchronous world. In the PCparadigm, a machine knows 
where itsperipherals are; the associations have 
beenestablished (by the user or by software) at somepoint in 
the past. When something disrupts thatsynchronicity, the 
software sometimes simplyhangs or dies. Improved plug-
and-play devicesupport in Windows XP and "hot-
pluggable"architectures such as USB and IEEE 1394 point 
the way toward a truly "asynchronous" PC, butthese 
dependencies do still exist at times. On theWeb, however, 
devices come and go, and latencyis highly variable. Robust 
Web architecturesneed dynamic discoverability and 
automaticconfiguration. If you accept the idea 
thateverything is loosely coupled and asynchronous,you 
introduce even more opportunities forfailure. For every 
potential interaction, you haveto entertain the idea that it 
won't actually occur,because the Web is only a "best-
effort"mechanism—if you click and get no result, youclick 
again. Every computing system thereforehas to be 
redesigned to recover from failedinteractions. 
X. IDENTITY 
Questions of identity are sometimes raised in thecontext of 
Trustworthy Computing. Identity isnot explicitly called out 
in the framework,because a user does not expect a 
computersystem to generate their identity. However, 
useridentity is a core concept against which servicesare 
provided. Assertions of identity (that is,authentication) need 
to be robust, so that takingactions that depend on identity 
(that is,authorization) can be done reliably. Hence, 
usersexpect their identities to be safe from unwanteduse. 
Identity is difficult to define in general, butparticularly so in 
the digital realm. We use theworking definition that identity 
is the persistent,collective aspects of a set of distinguishing 
characteristics by which a person (or thing) isrecognizable 
or known. Identity is diffuse andcontext-dependent because 
these aspect"snippets" are stored all over the place in 
digital,physical, and emotional form. Some of thisidentity is 
"owned" by the user, but a lot of it isconferred by others, 
either legally (for example,by governments or companies) or 
as informalsocial recognition. 
Many elements of Trustworthy Computing systems impinge 
on identity. Users worry about the privacy of computer 
systems in part because they realize that seemingly 
unrelated aspects of their identity can be reassembled more 
easily when the snippets are in digital form. This is bestn 
evidenced by growing public fear of credit-card fraud and 
identity theft as a result of the relative transparency and 
anonymity of the Internet versus offline transactions, even 
though both crimes are equally possible in the physical 
world. Users expect that information about themselves, 
including those aspects that make up identity, are not 
disclosed in unapproved ways. 




It's already challenging to manage extremelylarge networks 
of computers, and it’s just gettingharder. The immensity of 
this challenge has beenmasked by the fact that up to this 
point we havegenerally hired professionals to manage large 
systems. The shortcomings of the machines, thenetworks, 
the administration, the tools, and theapplications themselves 
are often mitigated bytalented systems managers working 
hard tocompensate for the fact that these componentsdon't 
always work as expected or desired.Many of the system 
failures that get a lot of attention happen because of system 
complexity. People make an administrator error, fail to 
install a patch, or configure a firewall incorrectly, and a 
simple failure cascades into a catastrophic one. There is a 
very strong dependency on human operators doing the right 
thing, day in and dayout. 
There are already too few knowledgeable administrators, 
and we're losing ground. Worse, the needs of administration 
are evolving beyond professional IT managers. On the one 
hand we are at the point where even the best operators 
struggle: systems are changing too rapidly for  people to 
comprehend. On the other, the bulk of computers will 
eventually end up in nonmanaged environments that people 
own, carry around with them, or have in their car or their 
house. We therefore need to make it easier for people to get 
the right thing to happen consistently with minimal human 
intervention. We must aim towards a point where decision-
makers can set policy and have it deployed to thousands of 
machines without significant ongoing effort in writing 
programs, pulling levers, and pushing buttons on 
administrators' consoles. 
The industry can address this in any of a number of ways. 
Should we actually write software in a completely different 
way? Should we have system administrators at all? Or 
should we be developing machines that are able to 
administer other machines without routine 
humanintervention? 
XII. PROGRAMMING TOOLS 
Each of these approaches requires new classes of software. 
As the absolute number and complexity of machines goes 
up, the administration problem outstrips the availability 
and capability of trained people. The result is that people in 
the programmingtools community are going to have to think 
about developing better ways to write programs. People who 
historically think about how to manage computers are going 
to have to think about how computers can become more 
selforganizing and self-managing. We need to continue to 
improve programming tools, because programming today is 
too error-prone. But current tools don't adequately support 
the process because of the number of abstraction layers that 
require foreground management. In other words, the 
designer needs not only to consider system architecture and 
platform/library issues, but also everything from 
performance, localization, and maintainability to data 
structures, multithreading and memory management. There 
is little support for programming in parallel, most control 
structures are built sequentially and the entire process is 
painfully sequential. And that is just in development; at the 
deployment level it is incredibly difficult to test for complex 
interactions of systems, versions, and the huge range in 
deployment environments. There is also the increasing 
diffusion of tools that offer advanced development 
functionality to a wider population but do not help novice or 
naive users write good code. There are also issues around 
long-term perspectives: for example, tools don't support 
"sunset-ing" or changing trends in capability, storage, speed, 
and so on. Think of the enormous effort devoted to Y2K 
because programmers of the 1960s and 1970s did not expect 
their code would still be in use on machines that far 
outstripped the capabilities of the machines of that era. 
XIII. INTEROPERABILITY 
The growth of the Internet was proof that interoperable 
technologies—from TCP/IP to HTTP—are critical to building 
large-scale, multipurpose computing systems that people 
find useful and compelling. (Similarly, interoperable 
standards, enforced by technology, policy orboth, have 
driven the success of many othertechnologies, from 
railroads to television.) It isobvious and unavoidable that 
interoperablesystems will drive computing for quite some 
time. But interoperability presents a unique set ofproblems 
for the industry, in terms oftechnologies, policies and 
business practices.Current "trustworthy" computing systems, 
suchas the air-traffic-control network, are very 
complex and richly interdependent, but they arealso 
engineered for a specific purpose, rarelymodified, and 
strictly controlled by a centralauthority. The question 
remains whether adistributed, loosely organized, flexible, 
anddynamic computing system—dependent oninteroperable 
technologies—can ever reach thesame level of reliability and 
trustworthiness.Interoperability also poses a problem in 
terms ofaccountability and trust, in that responsibility 
forshortcomings is more difficult to assign. Iftoday's 
Internet—built on the principle ofdecentralization and 
collective management—were to suffer some kind of massive 
failure, whois held responsible? One major reason 
whypeople are reluctant to trust the Internet is thatthey can't 
easily identify who is responsible forits shortcomings – who 
would you blame for acatastrophic network outage, or the 
collapse of 
the Domain Name System? If we are to createand benefit 
from a massively interoperable (andinterdependent) system 
that people can trust, wemust clearly draw the lines as to 
who isaccountable for what. 
XIV. CONCEPTUAL MODELS 
We face a fundamental problem withTrustworthy 
Computing: computer science lacksa theoretical framework. 
Computer security—itself just one component of 
TrustworthyComputing—has largely been treated as 
anoffshoot of communications security, which isbased on 
cryptography. Cryptography has a solidmathematical basis, 
but is clearly inadequate foraddressing the problems of 
trusted systems. Thecomputer-science community has not 
yetidentified an alternative paradigm; we're stuckwith 
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crypto. There may be research incomputational 
combinatory, or a different kindof information theory that 
seeks to study thebasic nature of information transfer, or 
researchin cooperative phenomena in computing, thatmay 
eventually form part of an alternative. But,today this is only 
speculation. A computing system is only as trustworthy as 
its weakest link. The weakest link is all too frequently 
human: a person producing a poor design in the face of 
complexity, an administrator incorrectly configuring a 
system, a business person choosing to deliver features over 
reliability, or a support technician falling victim to 
impostors via a "social engineering" hack. The interaction 
between sociology and technology will be a critical research 
area for Trustworthy Computing. So far there is hardly any 
crossfertilization between these fields. 
XV. CONCLUSION 
Delivering Trustworthy Computing is essentialnot only to 
the health of the computer industry,but also to our economy 
and society at large.Trustworthy Computing is a multi-
dimensionalset of issues. All of them accrue to four goals: 
Security, Privacy, Reliability, and BusinessIntegrity. Each 
demands attention. Whileimportant short-term work needs 
to be done,hard problems that require fundamental 
researchand advances in engineering will remain. 
Bothhardware and software companies, as well asacademic 
and government research institutions,need to step up to the 
challenge of tackling theseproblems. 
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